We present a two-stage model for the decision making process of …nancial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. In the …rst stage, …nancial analysts perform a fundamental analysis in which they are prone to a behavioral bias. In the second stage analysts can adjust their earnings forecast in line with their strategic incentives. The paper analyzes this decision process throughout the forecasting period and explains the underlying drivers. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we document that …nancial analysts overweight their private information throughout the entire forecasting period. At the same time, …nancial analysts behave strategically. They issue initial optimistic forecasts by strategically in ‡ating their forecast. In their last revision, they become pessimistic and strategically de ‡ate their earnings forecast, which creates the possibility of a positive earnings surprise. This analysis of the dynamics of the decision process provides empirical evidence on the coexistence of overcon…dence and strategic incentives.
Introduction
Studies of …nancial markets make assumptions concerning the behavior and decision process of market participants. The e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) postulates that all agents are rational and value each security for its fundamental value. To the extent that agents are not rational, the EMH assumes that deviations from rational behavior are random or when they are systematic, they are met in the market by rational arbitrageurs who eliminate any mispricing. More recently, behavioral …nance has emerged as an alternative view on …nancial markets. The behavioral …nance theory rests on the argument of limited arbitrage to argue that systematic deviations from e¢ ciency are expected to persist (Shleifer, 2000) . This debate between the neoclassical-based and behaviorally based …nance theory centers on the assumptions about the judgements, preferences, and decision of participants in …nancial markets. These assumptions about market participants pertain to, amongst others, the character of earnings forecasts (Shefrin, 2008).
Financial analysts are an important source of information to the stock market in the valuation of …rms (Schipper, 1991) . These analysts assimilate and process publicly available information, acquire private information and disseminate new information by issuing earnings forecasts and recommendations. It is, however, well documented that …nancial analysts' earnings forecasts systematically deviate from the rational decision process (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Abarbanell, 1991; Brown, 1997; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) and di¤erent explanations are put forward for these forecast ine¢ ciencies.
Broadly speaking, these systematic deviations from rationality in the decision making process can be assigned to a behavioral bias or a strategic bias (Friesen and Weller, 2006 ). This paper focuses on the characteristics of the decision making process of realworld …nancial analysts in issuing earnings forecasts.
The literature analyzing analysts' decision process is quite elaborate. Nonetheless, Ramnath et al. (2008) conclude that much of the analysts' decision process remains hidden in a black box. Recent studies analyzing the recommendations or earnings forecasts of …nancial analysts often focus on either the behavioral bias (see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001 and Hilary and Menzly, 2006) or the strategic bias (see e.g. Dugar and Nathan, 1995 and Ljungqvist et al., 2007) , or put the behavioral opposed to the strategic bias, suggesting that only one of them can be present (see e.g. Chen and Jiang, 2006 ). However, the question whether both coexist in the analyst's decision process has yet to be answered. Therefore, this paper develops a two stage model for the decision making process of …nancial analysts allowing for the coexistence of a behavioral bias and a strategic bias. In the …rst stage of the model, …nancial analysts perform a fundamental analysis in which they combine public and private information to form their earnings forecast. During this …rst stage, analysts can be a¤ected by a behavioral bias of which they are unaware. Once the fundamental analysis is complete, a …nancial analyst can, in the second stage, consciously determine to de ‡ate or in ‡ate his forecast because of strategic reasons. The model provides a clear separation and identi…cation of both biases and allows us to provide empirical evidence that behavioral biases and strategic incentives coexist.
The best known behavioral bias is overcon…dence. In the context of the …nancial market, which is characterized by a high degree of di¢ culty, low predictability and slow, noisy feedback, this bias is highly relevant (Fischo¤ et al., 1977 ). An overcon…dent …nan-cial analyst beliefs his personal assessment of the security's value is more accurate than the assessments of others (Barber and Odean, 2001 ). Additionally, …nancial analysts are confronted with several con ‡icts of interest. On the one hand, …nancial analysts want to provide investors with accurate earnings forecasts. On the other hand, they are persuaded to please the management of the …rms they cover and increase their compensation in terms of trading commissions, which can lead them to strategically change their forecast. To increase the revenues of their brokerage house through investment banking business (see e.g. Ljungqvist et al., 2007) or obtain additional information concerning the covered stock (see e.g. Chen and Matsumoto, 2006 ) …nancial analysts are inclined to please the management of the …rms they cover. Richardson et al (2004) show that management prefers high market expectations after an earnings announcement but beatable targets before in order to sell their own stock on favorable terms.
Their …ndings suggest that, in order to please management, …nancial analysts should be optimistic just after the earnings announcement, but pessimistic just before the next earnings announcement. To determine whether the strategic behavior of …nancial ana-lysts is in line with this management pleasing behavior, this paper performs an analysis of the dynamics of the decision process by investigating the strategic behavior of analysts throughout the forecasting period. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to pursue an in depth analysis of the decision process over time. We compare the results of our two stage model applied to the …rst quarterly earnings forecasts as well as to the last quarterly earnings forecast revisions and con…rm this pleasing behavior. We provide empirical evidence that …nancial analysts strategically in ‡ate their initial forecast by about 3%, but de ‡ate their forecast in their …nal revision by approximately 5%. At the same time …nancial analysts engage in static overcon…dence by overweighting their private information with roughly 3% throughout the entire forecasting period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the decision making process. Section 3 presents the empirical model and the selected data.
Section 4 discusses some descriptives on the data and section 5 discusses the estimation results. Next, section 6 provides some robustness checks. Finally, section 7 concludes.
The Two-Stage Model
In this section we introduce a two-stage model for …nancial analysts' decision making process when making their earnings forecasts. In the …rst stage, …nancial analysts perform an initial analysis in which they combine public and private information into an earnings forecast. The assimilation of this public and private information is modelled as a Bayesian expectation formation, similar to the model of Chen and Jiang (2006) . Following Gervais and Odean (2001) and Chen and Jiang (2006) , a is de…ned as the announced earnings of a …rm, which follows a di¤use zero-mean normal distribution; c is de…ned as a statistic for all public information about a:
with p c the precision of the public signal. Next, let x be the analyst's private information about a :
with p x the precision of the analyst's private signal and " x independent from " c . The
analyst's best conditional forecast of the actual earnings (a) given his private information (x) and his public information (c), using Bayes'rule, is as follows:
where h u px px+pc 2 [0; 1] is the precision of analyst's private signal relative to public information.
When an analyst interprets and weights publicly available information and private information, he may be unconsciously in ‡uenced by a behavioral bias. This could lead him to use a personal weighting scheme, that deviates from the correct rational scheme, and come up with a …rst stage earnings forecast F :
with k 2 [0; 1] the actual weight the analyst places on his private signal.
In the second stage, after the fundamental assessment of the company's earnings, strategic incentives might induce the analyst to alter his forecast. Con ‡icts of interest may persuade the analyst to in ‡ate or de ‡ate his …rst assessment:
with f the earnings forecast issued by the …nancial analyst and observed by the public.
The strategic incentives are modeled by introducing a multiplicative factor s 2 [0; +1).
As analysts are more likely to provide forecasts for stocks for which their true ex- h is identi…ed and for our purposes it is su¢ cient. The multiplicative factor s identi…es the strategic bias in an analyst's decision making process. An analyst only striving for the most accurate forecast should have s = 1. A signi…cant deviation of s from 1 is a result of the analyst acting on a con ‡ict of interest. s > 1 corresponds to an in ‡ation of the earnings forecast while s < 1 implies a de ‡ation of the earnings forecast.
We are interested in estimates of k h and s for drawing conclusions on behavioral biases and strategic incentives, but they can not be directly estimated. Therefore, we use a reduced form estimation equation. With f the analyst's expectation about the actual earnings, the expected forecast error is de…ned as:
Rearranging allows for a clear identi…cation of both behavioral and strategic biases a¤ecting an analyst's forecast and forecast error:
Applying a …rst-order Taylor approximation to both coe¢ cients in equation (7) around k h = 1 and s = 1, the reduced form estimation equation is transformed into:
allowing a clear separation of the behavioral and strategic bias in and respectively.
Consequently, and can be estimated and used to determine b k h and b s, as b k h = b + 1 and b s = b + 1.
The Empirical Model
To test the coexistence of a behavioral bias and strategic incentives, the reduced form equation (8) is estimated with following empirical model:
with i an analyst identi…er (who issues the forecast), k a company identi…er (on which company a forecast is issued) and t a time identi…er (to which quarter the forecast pertains companies. The presence of forecast revisions provides a measure of how closely analysts follow the stock that they cover (Green et al., 2007) . Therefore, the di¤erence in sample size suggests that many analysts focus mainly on a few companies, only issuing revisions for those.
Data Descriptives
When analyzing the strategic behavior of …nancial analysts it is imperative to understand what it is that pleases the management of a …rm. Richardson et al. (2004) suggest that management wishes to sell stock on favorable terms after an earnings announcement. Since the 1990's …rms'management is often compensated by stock options inducing an increased interest in the stock price. In this context, management prefers high market expectations after an earnings announcement but beatable targets before an earnings announcement. The reason is that there is an asymmetric response to earnings surprises. Skinner and Sloan (2002) …nd that the average response to negative earnings surprises is signi…cantly larger in magnitude than the average response to positive earnings surprises. Bartov et al. (2000) show that …rms which manage to beat or meet their earnings expectations enjoy an average quarterly return that is almost 3%
higher. These empirical …ndings suggest that, in order to please management, …nancial analysts should be optimistic just after the earnings announcement, but be pessimistic just before the next earnings announcement. We evaluate these dynamics of the decision process by investigating the strategic behavior of analysts throughout the forecasting period.
This in depth analysis of the decision process throughout the forecasting period requires the comparison of the …rst forecasts to the last revisions. In Figure The descriptives already suggest that …nancial analysts are, in some periods of time more than others, optimistic in their initial forecast. Their last revision, on the contrary, is systematically pessimistic and additionally consistently more negative than their initial forecast. These preliminary …ndings are consistent with management pleasing behavior. In the next section, we take a closer look at the decision process and analyze the underlying drivers throughout the forecasting period.
Empirical Results

Main Findings
Both data sets contain …nancial analysts' earnings forecasts for a particular stock at a certain point in time. This three way panel possibly contains unobserved e¤ects such as analyst, time, …rm and industry e¤ects. To control for these unobserved e¤ects, When a forecast ends up below the actual reported earnings this can be attributed to earnings management by the …rm covered or by strategic de ‡ation by the analyst. A …rm …xed e¤ects estimation eliminates this endogeneity issue. Consequently, to estimate equation (9) we use …rm …xed e¤ects with clustered standard errors by 211 business groups 4 . Table 1 presents estimation results on the weighting factor b k h and the strategic factor b s. These estimates are obtained from the reduced form estimation equation (9), whose full estimation results can be found in Table 7 in the Appendix. and the strategic factor s. These factors are extracted from the reduced form estimation equation (9) . The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The choice of the …rst or last forecast is therefore not innocent. Depending on the purpose of a study the …rst or last forecast might be more appropriate (or both as a robustness).
Closely Monitored Stocks
The First Forecast sample contains 322,123 observations while the Last Revision sample only has 60,047 observations. The First Forecast sample contains all initial forecasts.
The Last Revision sample then excludes analysts who issue a single forecast in a given quarter on a particular company, and only contains the revisions of analysts who update their initial forecasts within that quarter 5 . Examining both samples more closely, it becomes clear that the di¤erence in size is due to a signi…cantly smaller amount of companies being followed in the Last Revision sample. In the First Forecast sample analysts cover 2,773 companies while in the Last Revision sample analysts only cover 747 companies. These di¤erences indicate that the majority of analysts follows a limited number of stocks closely, while they keep track of other companies in a more super…cial manner. These closely monitored companies get initial forecasts and revisions while the other companies only get one forecast.
The presence of forecast revisions provides a measure of how closely analysts follow the stock that they cover (Green et al., 2007) . One can argue that the behavior towards stocks which are closely monitored is di¤erent from the behavior towards stocks which are followed only in a super…cial manner. Therefore, it is useful to compare the decision making process of super…cially covered stocks to the decision making process of highly monitored stocks. Additionally, studying the dynamics within the forecasting period Table 2 shows the estimates of k h and s for the Single Issue sample and the First of Revision sample. These factors are extracted from the reduced form estimation equation (9) , whose full estimation results can be found in Table 8 and the strategic factor s. These factors are extracted from the reduced form estimation equation (9) . The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test of whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Revision sample allows for a comparison between …rst forecasts and last revisions under similar sample size conditions. The conclusions with respect to the coexistence and dynamics of overcon…dence and strategic incentives remain. However, we are aware that the First of Revision sample could be subject to a selection bias. This sample is constructed based on a post-factum event: a revision at the end of the quarter is used as a criterion to select analysts at the beginning of the quarter. Our main goal, however, is to provide su¢ cient empirical evidence on the coexistence of overcon…dence and strategic incentives. Therefore we wish to compare the …rst forecasts to the last revisions under similar sample size conditions. To address the problem of di¤erent sample sizes, without possible selection bias issues, we draw a random sample of 60,047 observations from the First Forecast sample. The results again remain consistent with previous …ndings. Estimation results can be found in Table 12 in the Appendix.
The Extended Model
To further investigate the coexistence and dynamics of overcon…dence and strategic behavior and the validity of the two-stage model, we investigate the underlying drivers of overweighting ( 
where N ikt is the number of forecasts made by analyst i on …rm k up to time t and to be high ability analysts. The Star dummy equals 1 when the analyst is elected a star past October and zero otherwise 6 . The summary statistics and a description of all added variables can be found in Table 9 in the Appendix.
The weighting factor and strategic factor are now de…ned as a function of their underlying drivers:
6 Stickel (1992) shows that …nancial analysts, who are elected a star or who will become a star, perform better than other …nancial analysts, who have never been elected or will never become a star. The star status is awarded in October based on the performance of the previous year. One could argue to use the year previous to the awarded star status as the ability measure. Changing the de…nition of Star does not impact our empirical …ndings.
To map the relation between the k h and s and their underlying factors, we make use of the reduced form estimation equation (9) . Equation (8) shows that and from the reduced form estimation equation (9) are directly and linearly related to k h and s, respectively. Therefore, in equation (9) is made conditional on T R and Star and is made conditional on IB and T V ol. This extended reduced form estimation equation and its estimation results can be found in Table 10 ) for speci…c values of T R and Star. Star is evaluated at the values 0 and 1 because it is a dummy variable. T R is evaluated at the minimum, 1st quantile, mean, 3rd quantile and the maximum. When one covariate changes value, the others are kept at their mean value. for each value of the underlying driver can be found in Table 11 in the Appendix. With respect to the strategic incentives, the relations of IB and T vol with b s are as predicted by While we do …nd a negative relation between ability and overweighting as suggested by the mimicking hypothesis, it is not signi…cant. Therefore, we do not con…rm the mimicking hypothesis but neither do we con…rm the presence of dynamic overcon…dence.
We only con…rm a static overcon…dence: an analyst overweights each signal he receives regardless of past performance.
6 Robustness Checks
Alternative Consensus Measure
When testing the reduced form equation (8), the public information (c) is proxied by a consensus measure. In previous results this consensus is calculated as the mean of the earnings forecasts, for a particular quarter, previous to the analysts'own forecast. As a robustness check we also calculate the median consensus and we obtain similar results.
Estimation results are reported in Table 13 in the Appendix.
Regulatory Impact: 2002
The yearly average forecast errors in Figure 1 Table 3 shows the estimation results for the weighting factor k h and the strategic factor s for both the First Forecast sample and the Last Revision sample, for both time periods. Full estimation results of equation (9) can be found in Table 14 in the Appendix.
The empirical results con…rm what is to be expected. Before the new regulation is enforced, analysts strategically in ‡ate their …rst forecast and de ‡ate their last revision, which is in line with management pleasing behavior. After the 2002 regulation, which tackles con ‡icts of interest, strategic behavior becomes insigni…cant. Overcon…dence remains in both the pre and post time periods for both samples. This is additional empirical evidence that con…rms the model assumption of an unconscious behavioral (9) . The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. bias.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, a two-stage model is developed where behavioral and strategic biases can coexist. Secondly, the model is tested on a large dataset of quarterly earnings forecasts and the empirical results con…rm the coexistence of overcon…dence and strategic incentives. Thirdly, this paper is the …rst, as we know of, to empirically investigate the di¤erence in the decision making process between the …rst earnings forecast and the last earnings revision of …nancial analysts.
Descriptive statistics as well as regression results suggest that …nancial analysts issue initial optimistic (less pessimistic) earnings forecasts and pessimistic (more pessimistic) last earnings revisions.
Our empirical …ndings, on these dynamics of the decision process, show a consistent overweighting of private information throughout the forecasting period. A static overcon…dence is present in the …rst forecast as well as in the last revision. At the same time, our results show a strategic in ‡ation of the …rst earnings forecast after an earnings announcement followed by a strategic de ‡ation of the last forecast revision before the next earnings announcement. Both the initial in ‡ation and the …nal de ‡ation are consistent with management pleasing theories. An initially in ‡ated optimistic forecast stimulates buying behavior among investors, possibly pushing up the stock price and potentially making it an ideal moment for the management to sell their stock. A de ‡ated forecast revision before the announcement date creates beatable targets for management which can enjoy a higher return on their stock due to a favorable market reaction to the positive earnings surprise.
We conclude that overcon…dence and strategic incentives coexist in …nancial analysts' earnings forecasts where the size of the behavioral bias is slightly smaller than the strategic alteration. This suggests that strategic incentives are economically more relevant. The con ‡icts of interest that …nancial analysts are confronted with, are often believed to imply a trade o¤ between management pleasing and investor pleasing through forecast accuracy. As …nancial analysts engage in management pleasing, clearly the bene…ts outweigh the costs of a less accurate forecast. However, earnings forecasts formed under the earnings guidance of the management are shown to be more accurate (Hutton, 2005) . Consequently the …nancial analyst seems to please all parties, investors and management, involved. FE is the di¤erence between the earnings forecast and the actual, de ‡ated by the share price. Dev is the di¤erence between the earnings forecast and the consensus forecast, de ‡ated by the share price. f is the analyst's earnings forecast, de ‡ated by the share price. Age is the number of days between the issue of the analyst's earnings forecast and the reporting date of the actual earnings. Size is the logarithm of the market capitalization, calculated in the month prior to the forecast. FirmExp is the number of quarters an analyst has followed a certain stock. TotExp is the number of quarters the analyst is present in the data set. For both ability variables data starting from 1992 is used to prevent all analysts from starting with the same experience in 1996. FirmCompl is the number of companies an analyst follows during a quarter.
IndCompl is the number of sectors an analyst follows during a quarter. I/B/E/S identi…es 11 sectors using a proprietary classi…cation scheme for companies with similar business lines. TR measures the frequency of the analysts' earnings forecast being more accurate than the consensus forecast up until time t for …rm k. Star is a dummy variable which equals one when an analyst has been elected by the Institutional Investor all-American research Teams poll. IB is a dummy variable which equals one when an analyst is employed by a brokerage house which has assisted as underwriter in a public o¤ering of the company, for which the analyst is following the stock. The window of a¢ liation is …ve years, centered around the moment of the registration with the SEC of the public o¤ering. TVol is the average daily number of shares traded the previous quarter multiplied by the average daily price of the previous quarter. 
The second and third column show the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts'…rst earnings forecast. The third and fourth column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts'last earnings review. For both regressions …rm …xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard errors by business group. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) and s are obtained using following equations, derived from the extended reduced form estimation equation (11):
The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For all factors the two sided hypothesis test whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Weighting Factor First Forecast Last Revision
Covariates values and the strategic factor s. These factors are extracted from the reduced form estimation equation (9) . The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Explanatory
Random This table presents estimation results for the reduced form estimation equation (9) . Public information is proxied by the median consensus. The second and third column show the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts' …rst earnings forecast. The third and fourth column represent the coe¢ cient estimates and t-values, respectively, using analysts' last earnings review. For both regressions …rm …xed e¤ects is used with clustered standard errors by business group. These clustered standard errors are White (1984) standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a cluster, i.e. business group. The earnings forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The last two rows of this Table presents estimation results for the weighting factor k h and the strategic factor s. These factors are extracted from the reduced form estimation equation (9) . The delta method is used to obtain standard errors. For both factors the two sided hypothesis test whether they are signi…cantly di¤erent from 1 is performed. *,**,*** indicate signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
